Efeitos da propriedade estrangeira e das Normas Internacionais de Relato Financeiro no vencimento da dívida em empresas chilenas by Muñoz-Mendoza, Jorge A. et al.
Estudios Gerenciales vol. 35, N° 153, 2019, 416-428
Research article
Effects of foreign ownership and International Financial Reporting Standards on debt 
maturity in Chilean firms
Jorge A. Muñoz-Mendoza *
Profesor Asistente, Departamento de Gestión Empresarial, Universidad de Concepción, Los Ángeles, Chile.  
jormunozm@udec.cl 
Sandra M. Sepúlveda-Yelpo
Profesor Asistente, Departamento de Gestión Empresarial, Universidad de Concepción, Los Ángeles, Chile. 
ssepulveday@udec.cl
Carmen L. Veloso-Ramos
Profesor, Departamento de Gestión Empresarial, Universidad de Concepción, Los Ángeles, Chile. 
carmenveloso@udec.cl
Carlos L. Delgado-Fuentealba
Profesor Instructor, Escuela de Administración y Negocios, Universidad de Concepción, Chillán, Chile.
cadelgado@udec.cl
Abstract 
The objective of this article is to determine the effects of foreign ownership and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on 
debt maturity in Chilean companies. The study uses a fractional response model (FRM) on 20,586 companies. The results show foreign 
ownership has a negative and non-linear effect. Foreign ownership in Chilean firms is a substitute control means in relation to long-term 
debt. IFRS reduces maturity in large companies and extends them in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). These results suggest it is 
more important for large firms to control agency conflicts, while it is more important for SMEs to reduce information asymmetry. 
Keywords: maturity, foreign ownership, firm quality.
Efectos de la propiedad extranjera y Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera sobre la madurez de la 
deuda en firmas chilenas
Resumen
El objetivo de este artículo es determinar los efectos de la propiedad extranjera y de las Normas Internacionales de Información Financiera 
(NIIF) sobre la madurez de la deuda en las empresas chilenas. En el estudio se utiliza un modelo de respuesta fraccional (MRF) sobre 20.586 
empresas. Los resultados demuestran que la propiedad extranjera tiene un efecto negativo y no lineal, transformándose en un medio de 
control sustituto en relación con la deuda de largo plazo. Las NIIF reducen la madurez en empresas grandes y la extiende en las pequeñas 
y medianas empresas (Pymes). Estos resultados sugieren que para las firmas grandes es más importante controlar conflictos de agencia, 
mientras que para las Pymes es más importante reducir las asimetrías de información.
Palabras clave: madurez, propiedad extranjera, calidad crediticia.
Efeitos da propriedade estrangeira e das Normas Internacionais de Relato Financeiro no vencimento da dívida em 
empresas chilenas 
Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é determinar os efeitos da propriedade estrangeira e das Normas Internacionais de Relato Financeiro (IFRS) no ven-
cimento da dívida em empresas chilenas. O estudo utiliza um Modelo de Resposta Fracionária (MRF) em 20.586 empresas. Os resultados 
mostram que a propriedade estrangeira tem efeito negativo e não linear, tornando-se um meio de controle substituto em relação à dívida 
de longo prazo. O IFRS reduz a maturidade em grandes empresas e as estende em Pequenas e Médias Empresas (PMEs). Esses resultados 
sugerem que, para grandes empresas, é mais importante controlar conflitos entre agências, enquanto para as PMEs é mais importante 
reduzir as assimetrias de informações.   
Palavras-chave: maturidade, propriedade estrangeira, qualidade de crédito.
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1.  Introduction   
Debt maturity has been a widely studied subject in corpo-
rate finance. A large part of specialized literature has found 
that company characteristics, such as size, credit quality, asset 
tangibility, debt level, ownership structure and agency costs, 
are factors which determine corporate debt maturity.
Recently, a topic that has attracted the interest of 
researchers is the presence of foreign investors in compa-
nies’ ownership structure. This presence may have important 
effects on debt maturity, although limited international 
evidence has not been able to determine this relationship 
in a consistent manner. Some studies highlight that greater 
participation by foreign investors in corporate ownership 
leads to greater debt maturities (Ezeoha, Ogamba & Onyiuke, 
2008; Li, Yue & Zhao, 2009; Tanaka, 2015). These studies 
argue that foreign ownership exercises a complementary 
supervisory role on long-term debt and that such monitoring 
can constitute great advantages and improvements to 
corporate management. On the contrary, other studies argue 
that the negative relationship between foreign ownership and 
debt maturity reflects the convergence of interest between 
managers and external shareholders. This convergence 
makes foreign ownership play a substitute monitoring role 
with long-term debt (Choi & Choi, 2013). Although there are 
several studies in Chile that analyze corporate debt maturity 
determinants, none have analyzed the potential effects of 
foreign ownership and its implications.
In Chile, the growth of opening trade and investor 
confidence in the country's institutions have led to increased 
foreign ownership of companies. According to World Bank 
data, between 2007 and 2015, foreign direct investments 
increased from 7.81% to 8.44%. Along the same lines, the 
presence of foreign investors in the ownership structure of 
Chilean companies also increased for the same period. This 
figure increased from 18.40% to 19.15% for large firms, 
while for small firms this rise was much more pronounced, 
increasing foreign investments from 2.35% to 8.12% (Table 1). 
Changes in ownership structure have also coincided with 
the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) by Chilean companies. The objective of 
converging financial reports with IFRS standards is to allow 
domestic and foreign investors to standardize accounting 
rules and international financial statement comparability 
(Bae, Tan & Welker, 2008; Bhat, Callen & Segal, 2016). 
Although there is a wide range of literature to support 
the significant advantages of IFRS adoption in reducing 
information asymmetries affecting investors, its effects on 
debt maturity have been scarcely discussed. Currently, the 
literature has not reached a clear conclusion. The positive 
effect on long-term debt generated by lower information 
asymmetry (Sengupta, 1998; Florou & Kosi, 2008; Kim, 
Tsui & Yi, 2011; Simmer de Lima, Sampaio & Gotti, 2018) 
is opposed to the negative effect with which IFRS mitigates 
agency conflicts through short-term debt (Zhang, 2008; Kosi 
& Florou, 2009; Chen & Zhu, 2013). In Chile, this matter has 
not yet been addressed. Moreover, differentiated adoption 
between large firms (since 2009) and small and medium 
enterprises (since 2013) may impose a differentiated effect 
of IFRS on the debt maturity of these firms. Given that small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) are not obliged to report 
financial information, the degree of information asymmetry 
that characterizes them is greater when compared to large 
companies.
The general objective of our study is to determine the 
effects of foreign ownership and mandatory IFRS adoption on 
the debt maturity of Chilean companies. Our work contributes 
to national empirical literature and that of emerging markets 
in three aspects. First, we evaluate the effects of foreign 
ownership on debt maturity. Second, we evaluate the impact 
of mandatory IFRS adoption in both large companies and 
SMEs. It should be considered that adoption periods differ 
according to size. Third, we evaluate the interactive effects 
of foreign ownership and IFRS implementation according to 
firm size and credit quality. This point is to determine if these 
variables have conditional and interactive effects on debt 
maturity.
A grouped data set composed of 20,586 companies was 
used. This information was obtained from the Longitudinal 
Business Survey (LBS) for the 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015 
periods. Our results show that foreign ownership reduces 
debt maturity, which is consistent with the idea that investors 
use debt maturity to control agency costs. The effects of 
IFRS adoption differ according to firm size. In large firms, 
the adoption of this regulation reduces debt maturity, while 
in SMEs it increases it significantly. This effect is related to 
changes in information asymmetries since IFRS adoption by 
a firm. In any case, debt maturity increases when adoption 
occurs in firms with high credit quality. These results are 
relevant for firms, investors and policymakers. For firms and 
investors, our results help them to know the effects of foreign 
ownership on debt maturity as well as its control implications 
on corporate governance. It even allows them to know the 
relevance of IFRS in controlling information asymmetries, 
promoting foreign participation in corporate ownership and 
its impact on debt maturity decisions. In addition, regulators 
and policymakers can quantify the differentiated effect of 
IFRS according to firm size, and thereby strengthen policies 
aimed at facilitating firms’ access to debt with more favorable 
terms.
This article is structured as follows. Following the 
introduction, section 2 reviews the literature related to the 
effects of foreign ownership and the adoption of IFRS on debt 
maturity. This section also states the research hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents the data and analysis methodologies. 
Section 4 shows the results obtained. Finally, section 5 groups 
the conclusions of this article.
Table 1.  Foreign ownership and direct foreign investment in Chile (average). 
Item 2007 2009 2013 2015
Large firms (%) 18.40 11.54 15.45 19.15
Small firms (%) 2.35 2.47 7.52 8.12
Direct foreign investment (% of GDP) 7.81 8.10 7.57 8.44
Source: Longitudinal Business Survey and World Bank.
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2.  Theoretical framework and hypothesis
This section presents a literature review and research 
hypothesis derived from its analysis. This section has been 
divided into two parts. The first part details the theoretical 
and empirical evidence at an international level and analyzes 
the effect of foreign ownership on debt maturity. The second 
part focuses attention on studies, which analyze the impact of 
IFRS on debt maturity.
2.1.  Effects of foreign ownership on debt maturity
Ownership structure is a fundamental determinant of 
the corporate debt maturity decision and its effects can 
hardly be separated from the agency problem. The degree of 
ownership concentration, either by controlling shareholders 
or by managerial participation in corporate ownership, can 
have positive or negative effects on debt maturity. Some 
studies argue that ownership concentration has a negative 
effect on debt maturity. This fact could be explained by the 
controlling effect of ownership concentration on company 
management being met through the issuance of short-
term debt. This decision would inhibit the use of investment 
policies to expropriate wealth from various stakeholders 
(Ozkan, 2000; Guney & Ozkan, 2005; Jiraporn & Tong, 2008). 
On the contrary, other studies have argued that an increase in 
managerial or controlling shareholder ownership would lead 
companies to issue long-term debt as a way of entrenching 
corporate management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Berger, 
Ofek & Yermack, 1997; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2005; Arslan & Karan, 2006; 
Benmelech, 2006; Harford, Li & Zhao, 2008; Tanaka, 2015). 
Despite the contradictory nature of this research, ownership 
structure continues to be relevant to debt maturity.
The effect of foreign ownership arouses investigative 
interest due to its increased relevance in recent years of gro-
wing globalization (Schmukler & Vesperoni, 2006). Empirically, 
some works have highlighted that foreign investors parti-
cipating in corporate ownership can assume the role of a 
relevant institutional investor capable of influencing corporate 
policies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Gillan & Starks, 2003; 
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). In fact, several studies show 
that foreign ownership can have an important effect on various 
business areas such as corporate performance, dividend 
policy and firm value (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; Chevalier, 
Prasetyantoko & Rokhim, 2006; Baba, 2009; Kimura & Kiyota, 
2007; Jeon, Lee & Moffett, 2011; Cao, Du & Hansen, 2017).
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) point out that company 
access to international capital markets and national financial 
liberalization can have significant effects on the debt 
term decision. However, international evidence analyzing 
the effects of foreign ownership on debt maturity is still 
scarce and no consensus has been reached regarding this 
relationship. Some studies argue that foreign ownership has a 
positive effect on debt maturity, which is known as the foreign 
ownership monitoring hypothesis. Tanaka (2015) corroborates 
this relationship in a study of Japanese companies between 
2005 and 2009. The author argues that foreign ownership is 
a means of control which disciplines corporate management, 
allowing them to access longer term debt and lower costs. 
In this case, foreign ownership prolongs its supervising 
function with the issuance of long-term debt. Although 
Jones (2006) warns that there may be conflicts between 
foreign and national owners, Li et al. (2009) argue that the 
described supervision effect has greater advantages, such 
as the attraction of new capital, technological improvements 
and corporate management. This view is also supported by 
Ezeoha et al. (2008). 
Other studies indicate that foreign ownership has a 
negative impact on debt maturity, which supports the 
risk modification hypothesis. Relying on the theory of 
agency, these researchers have indicated that company 
administrators can expropriate wealth from bondholders 
through asset substitution. Nguyen (2012) states that, to 
mitigate this practice, bondholders shorten debt terms and 
foreign investors press firm managers to act in accordance 
with maximizing firm value. Choi and Choi (2013) developed 
a study for Korean companies that corroborated this negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and debt maturity. 
The authors add that foreign ownership promotes the 
convergence between managerial and external shareholder 
interests, replacing their oversight role with long-term debt.
Results are contradictory according to scarce literature 
available. However, according to Datta et al. (2005), ownership 
structure may have a non-linear effect on debt maturity. In 
our case, the percentage of existing foreign ownership could 
determine a specific effect on debt maturity. Ezeoha et al. 
(2008) and Tanaka (2015) argue that foreign ownership has a 
positive effect on debt maturity, in a study indicating that the 
percentage of foreign ownership in Nigerian and Japanese 
firms is 27.80% and 22.30%, respectively. On the contrary, 
Choi and Choi (2013) point out that foreign participation in 
Korean firms reaches only 9.07%. In Chile, according to the 
LBS, foreign ownership in companies reaches 6.87%. These 
facts lead us to propose the following hypotheses:
•  H1: foreign ownership has a negative effect on debt maturity.
• H2: the effect of foreign ownership on debt maturity is non-
linear.
2.2.  Effects of IFRS adoption on debt maturity
IFRS adoption can have significant effects on capital 
markets and participants. Decreased levels of information 
asymmetry and improvements in company transparency are 
usually attributed to IFRS adoption (Li, 2010; Daske, Hail, Leuz 
& Verdi, 2008, 2013). IFRS adoption has been more important 
for external investors than for companies themselves, since 
it affects their decisions and those of various financial system 
actors (Bhat et al., 2016). This relevance of IFRS is usually 
quantified, based on differences that separate it from local 
accounting criteria in terms of benefits and transparency 
policies on financial information disclosure (Chaplinsky & 
Ramchand, 2004; Ding, Hope, Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2007; Bae 
et al., 2008). Thus, the effects of implementing IFRS would 
be systemically more relevant for investors as differences 
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are greater (Sengupta, 1998; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Chen, 
Chen, Wang & Yao, 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015).
Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) and Hail, Leuz and 
Wysocki (2010) point out that mandatory IFRS adoption 
provides more detailed and internationally comparable 
financial information. This quality of regulation is a key 
factor in assessing investor risks (Dye, 1990; Verrecchia, 
2001; Easley & O'Hara, 2004; Frost, 2007; Lambert, Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2007; Ball, Bushman & Vasvari, 2008; De Franco, 
Vasvari & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009; DeFond, Hu, Hung 
& Li, 2011). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2004) add that these elements have important 
effects on the debt term contracts, such as cost and maturity, 
and that they are used to mitigate agency costs between firms 
and bondholders. International evidence is scarce and has not 
shown robust results regarding IFRS effects on debt maturity. 
The complexities imposed by institutional differences of the 
countries analyzed and the way in which they adopted IFRS 
could explain the discrepancy in the results.
Some literature has shown that the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS has a positive effect on debt maturity. Sengupta (1998) 
and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) support this result, arguing 
that the reduction of information asymmetry reduces debt 
costs, encouraging the issuance of longer-term debt. Florou 
and Kosi (2008) find a similar result for firms in the United 
Kingdom, although their results lack significance. Kim et 
al. (2011), in a study carried out with companies from 40 
countries with different legal origins between 1997 and 2005, 
show that IFRS are positively associated with long-term debt, 
although adoption has been voluntary. Simmer de Lima et al. 
(2018) analyzed 122 Brazilian firms, of which 93 adopted IFRS 
on a mandatory basis and 29 did so voluntarily. Their results 
show that the positive relationship between mandatory 
IFRS adoption and debt maturity is due to reductions in 
information asymmetry reducing investor risks through long-
term debt. When adoption is voluntary, similar though more 
limited effects are found. On this point, the authors argue that 
mandatory IFRS adoption would have more relevant effects 
systemically than voluntary adoption, since the latter would 
be guided only by the willingness of companies to differentiate 
their quality from those who do not adopt those standards.
Other investigations have found contrary results 
to those described. Zhang (2008) points out that IFRS 
adoption imposes a more conservative accounting criterion 
and discourages discretionary policies aimed at wealth 
expropriation, which would be negatively correlated with debt 
maturity. This is supported by other empirical studies as well 
(Kosi & Florou, 2009; Ball, Xi & Shivakumar, 2014). Chen and 
Zhu (2013) corroborate this vision and add that IFRS are an 
effective means to mitigate the effects of the agency problem 
between firms and the bondholders. This effect may be more 
pronounced in countries with reduced legal protection for 
investors (Beneish, Miller & Yohn, 2015) or where IFRS show 
greater differences in relation to local accounting criteria 
(Chen et al., 2015).
In Chile there are no studies that have analyzed the 
relationship between IFRS adoption and debt maturity. Chile 
is a country governed by civil law, where the limited legal 
protection offered to investors can mean greater conflicts of 
interest between firms and debt holders, and have significant 
effects on debt contract terms. In addition, the fact that 
regulations are adopted differently by large companies and 
SMEs requires separating analyses for various reasons, 
which contrasts the need to reduce information asymmetry 
and control agency costs. First, the Commission for Financial 
Markets (CFM) requires large companies to disclose their 
financial statements on a quarterly basis. In line with 
Chen and Zhu (2013), this would make the asymmetry of 
information in large firms less than in SMEs. In addition, its 
diluted ownership structures and the presence of controlling 
shareholder would generate higher agency costs. In this case, 
IFRS could mitigate these costs by promoting a reduction 
on debt maturity for large companies. Thus, the following 
hypothesis was formulated:
• H3: mandatory IFRS adoption has a negative effect on the 
debt maturity of large companies.
Second, SMEs are characterized by more concentrated 
ownership structures that suggest a more limited effect 
of agency costs. However, since they are not required to 
report their financial statements, the degree of information 
asymmetry that characterizes them is greater. According 
to Sengupta (1998) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), if IFRS 
adoption helps reduce this information asymmetry, SMEs 
could access debts with lower financing costs and greater 
maturity. Therefore, we formulated the following hypothesis:
• H4: mandatory IFRS adoption has a positive effect on SME 
debt maturity.
 
Since mandatory IFRS adoption provides more detailed 
and comparable financial information, the process of 
assessing risks and firm quality by investors is facilitated 
(Verrecchia, 2001; Easley & O'Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 
2007; Barth et al., 2008; Hail, 2010). If investors can assess 
firm quality with greater precision, then this means that 
information asymmetry is lower as well as the risk of their 
investment. This translates into a relaxation of debt contract 
terms, such as cost and maturity (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). 
This could be reinforced if foreign investors become a means 
of control, disciplining corporate management and allowing 
firms to access debt in more flexible terms (Tanaka, 2015). 
This leads us to formulate the following hypotheses:
• H5: mandatory IFRS adoption has a positive effect on debt 
maturities of companies with high credit quality.
• H6: foreign ownership has a positive effect on debt matu-
rities of high quality companies following IFRS adoption.
3.  Methodology 
This section presents the data and econometric models 
used in this research. It has been divided into two parts. The 
first part details the firm sample and conceptual description 
of the variables according to empirical evidence. The second 
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part presents the econometric methodology based on 
Fractional Response Model.
3.1.  Data sample
The data used in this investigation were obtained from 
the Longitudinal Business Survey (LBS). The information 
corresponds to the four versions of the database, LBS1, 
LBS2, LBS3 and LBS4, which report data corresponding to 
the 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015 periods, respectively. This 
survey is prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Development 
and Tourism in Chile and only reports accounting and 
business information, but not information related to the stock 
exchange. The total sample is made up of 20,586 companies. 
This sample was obtained after eliminating companies 
with incomplete records from the financial sector. The data 
were grouped in a cross section of all the surveys because 
the companies can not be identified (the information was 
anonymous). The variables are presented in Table 2.
The dependent variable in the investigation is debt 
maturity (DM) measured by long-term debt to total debt ratio. 
This measurement has been widely suggested by various 
national and international empirical works (Stohs & Mauer, 
1996; Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Azofra, Saona & Vallelado, 2004; 
Dang, 2011; Muñoz & Sepúlveda, 2016).
Debt maturity is controlled through various measures 
of ownership structure (OS). Table 2 includes the dummy 
variables owner/manager (OS1), partner/manager (OS2), 
outside/manager (OS3) and the percentage of managerial 
ownership (MO). These variables have been used by several 
empirical works that attempted to quantify the effects of 
the separation of control and corporate ownership on debt 
maturity (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ozkan, 2000; Fleming, 
Heaney & McCosker, 2005; Guney & Ozkan, 2005; Datta et 
al., 2005; Benmelech, 2006; Harford et al., 2008). In these 
types of variables we also include the percentage of foreign 
ownership (FOS) to quantify the potential controlling role of 
these investors in business management through debt terms 
(Ezeoha et al., 2008; Choi & Choi, 2013; Tanaka, 2015).
Two dummy variables were used, which consider the 
differentiated implementation between SMEs and large 
companies, to control the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on debt maturity. We defined IFRSS as a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 since 2013 and 0 otherwise; while IFRSL is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 since 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
These years mark the periods in which both SMEs and large 
companies obligatorily adopted the IFRS.
Other control variables suggested by international 
evidence are also included. Firm credit quality (FQ) is quanti-
fied through the Z-Score indicator (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 
1991); leverage (LEV) is used to corroborate whether debt 
maturity is related to liquidity or underinvestment problems 
(Johnson, 2003; Barclay, Marx & Smith, 2003; Billet, King & 
Mauer, 2007; Alcock, Finn & Keng, 2012); agency costs (AC) 
are used to measure the effect of managerial discretion on 
the principal-agent conflict (Leland, 1998; Lasfer, 1999; Ang, 
Cole & Lin, 2000; Fleming et al., 2005). Monitoring by external 
funders (EM) is used as an external control mechanism for 
debt maturity (Muñoz and Sepúlveda, 2016); firm profitability 
(FP) is measured through return on assets (Barclay & Smith, 
1995); the annual growth of sales is used to quantify the role 
of firm growth opportunities (GO) according to several studies 
(Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Barclay & Smith, 1995). 
We also include firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (ATN) and 
holding company (HD) ownership.
3.2.  Econometric method
The fractional response model (FRM) proposed by Papke 
and Wooldridge (1996) was used to estimate the effects of 
foreign ownership and IFRS adoption on debt maturity. This 
model is used both to estimate probabilities and any type 
of continuous variable that can be represented as a ratio 
between 0 and 1, as in the case of debt maturity. The model 
for pooled data considers that this variable is restricted by 
a logistic distribution estimated by pseudo-likelihood. The 
empirical model is the following:
Table 2. Variables 
Variable Definition
A. Dependent variable
DM Debt maturity Long-term debt to total debt ratio
B. Ownership structure (OS)
OS1 Owner/manager Dummy 1 if the manager is the 
complete owner and 0 otherwise
OS2 Partner manager Dummy 1 if the manager is an 
associate manager and 0 otherwise
MO Managerial ownership Equity share of business associate 
manager
OS3 Outside manager Dummy 1 if the manager is outsider 
(non-owner) and 0 otherwise
FOS Foreign ownership Percentage of foreign ownership
C. IFRS mandatory adoption
IFRSS IFRS SMEs Dummy equal to 1 since 2013 and 0 
otherwise
 IFRSL IFRS Large firms Dummy equal to 1 since 2009 and 0 
otherwise
D. Other control variables
FQ Firm quality Z-Score index
LEV Leverage Total debt to equity ratio.
AC Agency costs Annual operating expenses to sales 
ratio
EM External monitoring Years extension of relationship with 
external funders
FP Firm profitability Return on assets ratio
GO Growth opportunities Annual sales growth
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets in 
millions of pesos
ATN Asset tangibility Long-term assets to total assets 
ratio
HD Holding Dummy 1 if the firm belongs to 
business holding and 0 otherwise
Source: own elaboration.
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DMi = ϐ0+ϐ1OSi+ϐ2(MOi x OS2i) + ϐ3(MO²i  x OS2i)  
+ ϐ4(FOSi x DSIZEi) + ϐ5(FOS
2
i  x DSIZEi) + ϐ6IFRSf 
+ϐ7FQi + ϐ8FO
2
i  + ϐ9LEVi + ϐ10ACi + ϐ11EMi + ϐ12FPi                      (1)
+ ϐ13GOi + ϐ14SIZEi + ϐ15ATNi + ϐ16HDi + ϐ17Dyear 
+ ϐ18DSector + εi
The dependent variable DMi indicates the debt maturity 
of firm i. The ownership structure dummy variables (OSi) 
are defined according to what is indicated in Table 2. In 
addition, we include the managerial ownership (MOi) and 
foreign ownership (FOSi), as well as their quadratic level MO i
2 
and FOSi
2  to evaluate a possible non-monotonous effect of 
these variables on debt maturity. We use the dummy variable 
DSIZE, defined in two parallel ways, depending on whether 
the firm is large or SME. In this way, we control the observable 
heterogeneity between both types of companies. Note that 
managerial ownership is incorporated as a control variable 
only when the manager is a partner (OS2).
The IFRSf variable has a value of 1 since the year in which 
companies of size f = (L,S)1 adopted the regulations and 0 
otherwise, according to Table 2. These variables capture 
the contemporary, systematic and absorbing effect of this 
regulation on debt terms.
Other control variables based on specific company 
qualities are also included in the econometric analysis. The 
firm credit quality (FQi) and its square (FQi
2), leverage (LEVi), 
agency costs (ACi), monitoring of external financiers (EMi), 
firm profitability (FPi), firm growth opportunities (GO]), firm 
size (SIZEi), asset tangibility (ATNi) and business holding 
company ownership (HDi) constitute these control variables. 
The estimated model is also controlled by economic sectors 
(DSector) and temporal variations (Dyear), using dummy 
variables. Finally, εi is a random disturbance.
A second model was constructed to evaluate the effects 
of foreign ownership and firms with high credit quality since 
IFRS adoption. The following model was used:
DMi = ϐ0+ϐ1OSi+ϐ2(MOi x OS2i) + ϐ3(MO²i  x OS2i)  
+ ϐ4(FOSi x IFRSf) + ϐ5(HQi x IFRSf) + ϐ6FQi 
+ϐ7FQ
2
i + ϐ8LEVi + ϐ9ACi + ϐ10EMi + ϐ11FPi + ϐ12GOi                      (2)
+ ϐ13SIZEi + ϐ14ATNi + ϐ15HDi + ϐ16Dyear 
+ ϐ17DSector + εi
The model (2) includes several interactive variables of 
interest for research. The variable (FOSi × IFRSf) measures 
the effect of foreign ownership on debt maturity since size f = 
(L,S) firms obligatorily adopted IFRS, while the variable (HQi 
× IFRSf) measures the interactive effect of IFRS on firms with 
high credit quality, HQi being a dummy variable which adopts 
the value 1 when the Z-Score of firm i is above the average 
of its sector and of its respective survey. The other control 
variables are defined identically to model 1.
A third model was developed to assess the effects of 
foreign ownership on debt maturity in firms with high credit 
quality, which adopted IFRS:
DMi = ϐ0+ϐ1OSi+ϐ2(MOi x OS2i) + ϐ3(MO²i  x OS2i)  
+ ϐ4(HQi x FOSi  x IFRSf) + ϐ5FQi+ ϐ6FQ
2
i 
+ϐ7LEVi + ϐ8ACi + ϐ9EMi + ϐ10FPi + ϐ11GOi                            (3)
+ ϐ12SIZEi + ϐ13ATNi + ϐ14HDi + ϐ15Dyear 
+ ϐ16DSector + εi
Where (HQi × FOSi × IFRSf) is an interactive variable that 
measures the effect of foreign ownership on debt maturity 
since firms of size f = (L,S) and with high credit quality adopted 
IFRS. The other control variables are defined as in models (1) 
and (2).
4.  Results
This section presents the empirical results of this re-
search. It has also been divided into two parts. The first part 
presents the statistical analysis of the sample. The second 
part shows the effects of foreign ownership and IFRS adoption 
on debt maturity according to econometric model results.
4.1.  Sample description
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. 
It is important to note that the results of each period are not 
strictly comparable due to differences in firm sizes used in 
the sample frame of each survey, and the fact that firms do 
not necessarily repeat from one sample to another.
It can be seen that the debt maturities of the companies 
included in the sample increased between 2007 and 2015. 
Long-term financing increased from 16.63% in 2007 to 
22.72% of the total corporate debt in 2015. In any case, and 
despite the increase in debt maturity, short-term financing 
continues to be the most relevant in debt composition. 
Moreover, we observed that the debt-to-equity ratio also 
increased, evidencing the predominance of debt over the 
issuance of capital as a source of financing. In addition, the 
increase in years of commercial relationships with external 
funders, from 12.82 years in 2007 to 18.17 years in 2015, is 
consistent with the debt term structure.
The longer term of the observed debt also correlates 
with asset maturity. In 2007, 28.56% of company assets 
corresponded to long-term investments, increasing to 
35.15% in 2015. This reveals that companies match financing 
maturities and those of their investments. Another fact that 
is interesting and common in countries governed by civil 
law (such as Chile), is the growing proportion of companies 
belonging to business holdings, increasing from 13.57% to 
31.69% in the same period. 
Information concerning ownership structure shows 
results that agree with the growing use of long-term debt. The 
reduction observed in the percentage of companies managed 
by their owner between 2007 and 2015 is proportional to the 
increase in the number of companies managed by an external 
manager and the reduction of managerial ownership. In 
addition, it can be seen that in the same comparative period, 
foreign ownership in Chilean companies increased from 
3.75% to 9.20%.
1   L and S refer to large and SMEs firms, respectively.
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Finally, we observe that, on average, Chilean firms have 
a low probability of bankruptcy given the figures from the 
Z-Score indicator. However, the growing evolution of agency 
costs and progressive reduction of growth opportunities are 
consistent with the greater long-term debt use and ownership 
dilution observed in the sample over the periods studied.
4.2.  Effects of foreign ownership and IFRS adoption
IFRS adoption may not only affect the debt maturity of 
Chilean companies, but may also condition the role of foreign 
ownership and credit quality. Table 4 shows the results of 
the Wilcoxon test applied to large companies and SMEs, 
comparing the situation based on IFRS adoption. As seen for 
large firms, after the mandatory IFRS adoption long-term 
debt was reduced from 28.50% to 25.89%. In addition, there 
were significant decreases in foreign investor participation 
in corporate ownership and company credit quality. The 
opposite occurred for SMEs. Debt maturity, foreign owner- 
ship and credit quality of these companies increased after 
IFRS adoption. This result indicates that IFRS adoption 
corrects information asymmetries associated with firm 
quality. This correction also modifies the presence of foreign 
investors in company ownership. These results initially 
support the view that IFRS adoption can help differentiate 
firm quality and allows foreign investors to make better 
investment decisions.
Tables 5 and 6 show the three specifications of the fractio-
nal response model and their marginal effects. Dummy 
variables DSIZE and IFRS are defined for SMEs in table 5, 
while table 6 defines these variables for large firms. In 
both tables it can be seen that some control variables 
show expected effects according to empirical evidence. 
Firm characteristics such as credit quality (Flannery, 1986; 
Diamond, 1991), profitability (Barclay & Smith, 1995), external 
monitoring (Muñoz & Sepúlveda, 2016) and corporate 
holdings are factors that have a negative and significant 
impact on debt maturity. Therefore, firms with high credit 
quality (low risk) and greater profitability issue short-term 
debt. External monitoring and the creation of internal capital 
markets through corporate holdings also promote shorter 
term financing. This is relevant to the effects of firm credit 
quality. Although there is a negative effect on debt maturity, 
the observed nonlinearity suggests that firms with high 
credit quality prefer long-term debt. Other common results 
in both tables show that firm size (Benmelech, 2006; Alcock 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
Variable 2007 2009 2013 2015
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
A. Dependent variable
DM Debt maturity (%) 16.63 28.81 17.01 28.16 19.72 28.96 22.72 30.25
B. Ownership structure (OS)
OS1 Owner/manager (%) 35.71 49.60 21.64 41.21 18.15 38.54 12.51 33.09
OS2 Business associated manager (%) 38.04 48.66 41.05 49.29 36.63 48.18 29.67 45.68
MO Managerial ownership (%) 52.58 28.29 50.80 27.94 35.45 41.43 26.47 38.46
OS3 Outside manager (%) 27.23 45.85 38.29 47.47 45.19 49.77 57.80 49.39
FOS Foreign ownership (%) 3.75 18.40 5.98 22.95 8.54 27.07 9.20 27.96
C. Other control variables
FQ Firm quality (value) 5.74 5.21 3.59 3.25 3.74 4.19 6.90 3.97
LEV Leverage (ratio) 1.45 2.14 1.52 2.13 2.09 2.56 3.88 4.06
AC Agency costs (%) 11.38 15.74 24.50 21.12 17.75 18.30 20.15 20.81
EM External monitoring (years) 12.82 12.54 12.65 10.16 16.34 11.56 18.17 13.98
FP Firm profitability (%) 13.15 21.11 11.91 8.18 9.29 10.40 12.86 6.71
GO Growth opportunities (%) 22.83 30.68 14.90 33.86 16.78 31.49 11.06 32.47
SIZE Firm size 20.44 338.40 150.15 816.12 168.40 683.46 177.83 646.02
ATN Asset tangibility (%) 28.56 27.62 29.31 26.67 22.65 26.05 35.15 39.94
HD Holding (%) 13.57 34.25 21.52 41.10 29.37 45.55 31.69 46.53
Source: own elaboration.
Table 4. Wilcoxon test across mandatory IFRS adoption.
Variable IFRS adoption in large firms IFRS adoption in SMEs
Before After z-statistics Before After z-statistics
Debt maturity (%) 28.50 25.89 (-2.32)*** 13.74 20.14 (16.67)***
Foreign ownership share (%) 18.40 13.71 (-3.47)*** 2.39 7.84 (21.24)***
Firm quality 3.17 2.30 (-7.12)*** 5.71 8.43 (2.04)***
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: own elaboration
Muñoz-Mendoza et al. / Estudios Gerenciales vol. 35, N° 153, 2019, 416-428
423
Table 5. FRM for debt maturity in Chilean SMEs, marginal effects.
Variable Dependent variable: debt maturity measured by long-term debt to total debt ratio
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Ownership structure variables
OS1 -0.0121 -0.0113 -0.0117
(-2.29)** (-2.17)** (-2.23)**
OS2 0.0097 0.0091 0.0106
(1.76)* (1.94)* (1.75)*
MO 0.0989 0.0992 0.0999
(2.58)*** (2.57)*** (2.68)***
MO2 -0.0798 -0.0803 -0.0802
(-2.16)** (-2.22)** (-2.18)**
OS3 0.0108 0.0094 0.0114
(2.08)** (1.81)* (2.20)**
Foreign ownership and IFRS mandatory adoption in SMEs
FOS × SMEs -0.1528 -0.1447 -0.1495
(-1.67)* (-2.18)** (-1.83)*
FOS2 × SMEs 0.1483 0.1447 0.1474
(1.77)* (1.84)* (1.97)**
FOS critical value 51.52% 50.01% 50.71%
IFRSS 0.0223 0.0259 0.0246
(2.54)** (2.63)*** (3.16)***
FOS×IFRSS -0.0395 -0.0361 -0.0371
(-3.23)*** (-2.93)*** (-3.01)***
HQ×IFRSS 0.0170 0.0185 0.0172
(1.98)** (2.02)** (2.88)***
HQ× FOS×IFRSS 0.0116 0.0181 0.0151
(2.48)** (2.75)*** (2.63)***
Other control variables
FQ -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0061 -0.0055 -0.0056 -0.0058
(-3.75)*** (-3.74)*** (-3.74)*** (-3.79)*** (-3.78)*** (-3.78)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.77)*** (-3.76)***
FQ2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(2.07)** (2.11)** (2.07)** (2.18)** (2.20)** (2.18)** (2.10)** (2.13)** (2.10)**
LEV 0.0030 0.0031 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0032 0.0031
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
AC -0.0082 -0.0068 -0.0073 -0.0060 -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0085 -0.0069 -0.0075
(-0.63) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.41) (-0.65) (-0.53) (-0.57)
EM -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0010
(-3.23)*** (-3.23)*** (-3.24)*** (-3.25)*** (-3.26)*** (-3.25)*** (-3.21)*** (-3.22)*** (-3.22)***
FP -0.0809 -0.0847 -0.0832 -0.0815 -0.0854 -0.0835 -0.0804 -0.0845 -0.0828
(-4.79)*** (-5.02)*** (-4.94)*** (-4.84)*** (-5.07)*** (-4.96)*** (-4.77)*** (-5.02)*** (-4.93)***
GO -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.75) (-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.81) (-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.74)
SIZE 0.0220 0.0237 0.0229 0.0224 0.0240 0.0231 0.0223 0.0239 0.0234
(16.84)*** (17.80)*** (17.73)*** (17.09)*** (18.00)*** (17.87)*** (16.85)*** (17.81)*** (17.71)***
ATN 0.2389 0.2380 0.2386 0.2375 0.2366 0.2373 0.2393 0.2383 0.2389
(26.13)*** (26.10)*** (26.06)*** (26.04)*** (25.99)*** (25.97)*** (26.39)*** (26.33)*** (26.30)***
HD -0.0178 -0.0128 -0.0149 -0.0170 -0.0124 -0.0144 -0.0183 -0.0130 -0.0151
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(-3.30)*** (-2.29)** (-2.69)*** (-3.17)*** (-2.22)** (-2.61)*** (-3.41)*** (-2.32)** (-2.73)***
Observations 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: own elaboration.
Table 5. FRM for debt maturity in Chilean SMEs, marginal effects. (continuation)
Table 6. FRM for debt maturity in Chilean Large firms, marginal effects.
Variable Dependent variable: Debt maturity measured by long-term debt to total debt ratio
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Ownership structure variables
OS1 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0017
(-0.13) (-0.18) (-0.23)
OS2 0.0071 0.0073 0.0059
(1.94)* (1.97)* (1.78)*
MO 0.0998 0.0989 0.0990
(2.60)*** (2.58)*** (2.64)***
MO2 -0.0804 -0.0811 -0.0797
(-2.17)** (-2.26)** (-2.15)**
OS3 0.0099 0.0091 0.0109
(1.92)* (1.76)* (2.11)**
Foreign ownership and IFRS mandatory adoption in large firms
FOS × Large -0.0910 -0.0892 -0.0903
(-2.39)** (-2.40)** (-2.47)**
FOS2 × Large 0.0749 0.0687 0.0729
(2.06)** (2.02)** (2.03)**
FOS critical value 60.75% 64.91% 61.93%
IFRSL -0.0302 -0.0273 -0.0234
(-2.52)** (-2.61)*** (-2.77)***
FOS×IFRSL -0.0349 -0.0313 -0.0325
(-3.50)*** (-3.10)*** (-3.22)***
HQ×IFRSL 0.0179 0.0184 0.0177
(1.77)* (1.88)* (1.81)*
HQ× FOS×IFRSL -0.0201 -0.0164 -0.0175
(-2.19)** (-1.97)** (-2.03)**
Other control variables
FQ -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0053
(-3.70)*** (-3.68)*** (-3.69)*** (-3.61)*** (-3.58)*** (-3.60)*** (-3.75)*** (-3.73)*** (-3.73)***
FQ2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003
(2.05)** (2.07)** (2.05)** (1.96)** (1.96)** (1.94)* (2.08)** (2.10)** (2.07)**
LEV 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
AC -0.0075 -0.0061 -0.0066 -0.0058 -0.0045 -0.0051 -0.0084 -0.0069 -0.0074
(-0.58) (-0.47) (-0.51) (-0.45) (-0.35) (-0.40) (-0.65) (-0.53) (-0.57)
EM -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009
(-3.25)*** (-3.31)*** (-3.25)*** (-3.28)*** (-3.29)*** (-3.29)*** (-3.22)*** (-3.23)*** (-3.23)***
FP -0.0803 -0.0843 -0.0823 -0.0801 -0.0838 -0.0819 -0.0808 -0.0848 -0.0831
(-4.75)*** (-4.99)*** (-4.88)*** (-4.73)*** (-4.96)*** (-4.85)*** (-4.79)*** (-5.03)*** (-4.94)***
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prevails over debt maturity, even when firms of size f = (L, 
S) have obligatorily adopted IFRS. Although IFRS adoption 
translates into the disclosure of more detailed, comparable 
and transparent financial information, foreign owners 
consider this regulation as a means to reinforce their control 
through the issuance of short-term debt. On the other hand, 
the variable (HQi × IFRSf) indicates a positive and significant 
effect on debt maturity, which validates hypothesis H5. IFRS 
adoption promotes long-term debt when firms of size f = 
(L,S) have a high credit quality. This is complemented by the 
non-linear effect of firm credit quality (FQ) on debt maturity. 
Thus, mandatory IFRS adoption has a mitigating effect on 
information asymmetry, which is more pronounced in firms 
with high credit quality.
Finally, table 5 shows that the variable (HQi × FOSi × IFRSf) 
has a positive and significant effect on SMEs, supporting 
hypothesis H6. This result indicates that when foreign 
ownership increases in high-quality companies that adopt 
IFRS, debt maturities increase significantly. Foreign inves-
tors associate firm quality and IFRS adoption with lower 
levels of information asymmetry in SMEs and issue longer-
term debt as a monitoring mechanism. This is related 
to growing foreign ownership. On the other hand, table 6 
shows that this variable has the opposite effect, in which the 
substitute control role of foreign ownership predominates. 
This last result in large firms contradicts hypothesis H6.
5.  Conclusions 
Debt maturity is a topic of recurrent analysis in corporate 
finance, mainly due to its scope on corporate control. Recently, 
new factors have influenced debt maturity decisions, opening 
new topics for debate and discussion.
Growing trade liberalization in Chile over the last two 
decades and the strengthening of its institutional framework 
and regulations have been fundamental pillars for increased 
foreign direct investments. In addition, recent mandatory 
IFRS adoption by large companies and SMEs in Chile has 
allowed the disclosure of more reliable, transparent and 
comparable financial information. These elements can 
have relevant effects on debt maturity decisions in Chilean 
et al., 2012) and asset tangibility (Stohs & Mauer, 1996) have a 
positive impact on debt maturity. 
Foreign ownership is relevant to debt maturity. The varia-
ble FOS indicates a negative and significant effect, which 
validates hypothesis H1. This result initially agrees with 
Choi and Choi (2013), in that foreign ownership generates 
convergence between managerial and foreign shareholder 
interests. In addition, foreign ownership exercises a 
supervisory role that can be substituted with the issuance 
of long-term debt. However, this relationship is non-linear, 
which supports hypothesis H2. The U shaped relation indica-
tes that when foreign ownership is high, the negative effect is 
reversed and the emission of long-term debt is promoted in 
its place. For this, foreign ownership should be over 50% and 
60% in SMEs and large companies respectively (see tables 5 
and 6). On this threshold value, foreign ownership constitutes 
a means of complementary long-term debt control (Ezeoha 
et al., 2008; Tanaka, 2015).
IFRS have significant effects on debt maturity. However, 
these effects vary according to firm size. Table 5 indicates 
that mandatory IFRS adoption increases SME debt matu-
rities, validating hypothesis H4. This result is in line with 
several international studies (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Florou & Kosi, 2008; Kim et al., 2011; Simmer de Lima et al., 
2018). Given that SMEs are characterized by a greater degree 
of information asymmetry, IFRS adoption exerts an effect 
that would transform the dissipation of said asymmetries 
into lower financing costs, encouraging the use of long-term 
debt. Table 6 shows that IFRS adoption has the opposite 
effect on large companies. This result supports hypothesis 
H3 and agrees with other empirical evidence (Zhang, 2008; 
Kosi & Florou, 2009; Ball et al., 2014; Chen & Zhu, 2013). 
Although large firms disclose financial information to the 
market, potential firm agency problems with investors make 
IFRS adoption an effective means to control them through 
the issuance of short-term debt. This is relevant for Chilean 
companies, since weak legal protections for investors can be 
partially compensated with the adoption of these standards.
Tables 5 and 6 show that variable (FOSi × IFRSf) has a 
negative and significant effect on debt maturity. This result 
shows that the substitute control effect of foreign ownership 
GO -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0000
(-0.76) (-0.81) (-0.86) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.69)
SIZE 0.0227 0.0243 0.0234 0.0220 0.0235 0.0227 0.0221 0.0238 0.0230
(16.96)*** (17.87)*** (18.17)*** (16.27)*** (17.16)*** (16.99)*** (16.85)*** (17.78)*** (17.69)***
ATN 0.2388 0.2377 0.2385 0.2372 0.2363 0.2370 0.2392 0.2381 0.2388
(26.33)*** (26.26)*** (26.26)*** (26.02)*** (25.98)*** (25.96)*** (26.42)*** (26.35)*** (26.33)***
HD -0.0171 -0.0123 -0.0144 -0.0166 -0.0121 -0.0141 -0.0178 -0.0127 -0.0148
(-3.19)*** (-2.20)** (-2.60)*** (-3.08)*** (-2.16)** (-2.59)*** (-3.32)*** (-2.27)** (-2.68)***
Observations 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: own elaboration.
Table 6. FRM for debt maturity in Chilean Large firms, marginal effects. (continuation)
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companies, establishing a new research focus for this 
market. Furthermore, such effects are vital for debt maturity 
decisions by various investors, as well as how to determine 
the companies in which they should invest.
We analyzed the effects of foreign ownership and 
mandatory IFRS adoption on the debt maturity of Chilean 
companies. The contributions of our work and its implications 
for discussion are summarized in three aspects. First, our 
results indicate that foreign ownership has a negative and 
non-linear (U-shaped) effect on debt maturity. The negative 
relationship is observable for low foreign ownership levels, 
in which this type of ownership could exercise a substitute 
control effect with long-term debt. Chilean firms are 
characterized by low foreign ownership levels, which open 
spaces for wealth expropriation. Therefore, this negative 
relationship helps to reduce such spaces and promotes the 
convergence of firm and foreign owner interests through 
short-term debt issuance. This result becomes more relevant 
if we consider that Chile offers limited legal protection to non-
controlling investors. In any case, when foreign ownership 
exceeds 50% in SMEs and 60% in large companies, the 
previous effect is reversed and becomes positive. Based 
on these threshold values, foreign investors take control of 
companies, complementing and prolonging their monitoring 
role through the issuance of long-term debt.
Second, mandatory IFRS adoption has significant effects 
on debt maturity, although these effects vary according 
to firm size. Debt maturity is reduced in large firms due to 
mandatory IFRS adoption, while in SMEs it increases. Our 
results suggest that the benefits of IFRS adoption (reducing 
information asymmetry and mitigating agency problems 
between investors and firms) are valued differently by these 
types of companies. Adoption by SMEs, which do not disclose 
financial information, reduces information asymmetries, 
allowing them to access longer-term debt. For large firms, 
agency problems are proportionally more relevant than 
information asymmetry, and therefore IFRS adoption is a 
means to mitigate them through short-term debt.
Third, even when firms have adopted the IFRS, foreign 
ownership maintains a negative effect on debt maturity. 
This result suggests that the perception of potential agency 
conflicts is relevant. However, when firms are distinguished 
according to their credit quality, it is observed that IFRS 
adoption promotes long-term debt. This indicates that IFRS 
adoption and the possibility of distinguishing firm credit 
quality is a sign of lower information asymmetry. This is 
valued by foreign investors in SMEs and is positively related 
to long-term debt. These findings confirm that, since the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, foreign owners facilitate long-
term debt in SMEs with high credit quality. On the contrary, 
the largest agency conflicts perceived in large firms require 
issuing short-term debt, regardless of firm credit quality. 
These results contribute establishing parameters to investors 
regarding the type of firms in which to invest, and how they 
should influence corporate decisions. 
Our research has important implications for investors 
and regulators. For investors and owners, our work provides 
an empirical base allowing them to identify firms’ specific 
qualities for finance policy design, mainly in relation to size, 
credit quality and foreign ownership level. For regulators, 
it provides evidence of the relevance of the adoption of 
IFRS in debt maturity policy design, and how its application 
contributes differently to controlling risk factors such as 
agency costs and information asymmetry. Furthermore, 
our research provides evidence that supports policy design 
facilitating foreign investment in Chile, which may then 
establish or strengthen corporate control mechanisms.
Given the relevance of the IFRS and foreign ownership, it is 
important to extend this research into the potential effects of 
this standard on the corporate profit management of Chilean 
firms. The possibility of manipulating accounting information 
is a new focus of analysis and the role of foreign owners and 
the IFRS can be important regarding discretionary practices. 
Considering the weak legal protection offered by Chile’s 
institutional environment, the authors of this paper consider 
this an excellent avenue for further studies to explore.
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